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ABSTRACT
Objectives. Human factors have been identified as the most common causes of catastrophic accidents
in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, this study aims to analyze human causal factors of accidents in the
oil and gas industry using the human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas indus-
try (HFACS-OGI) framework.Methods. This study involved quantitative data collection for 184 accident
cases in the oil and gas industry that occurred from 2013 to 2017 from the International Association
of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) database. The causal factors of these accidents were coded using the
HFACS-OGI framework. Accident datawere analyzed using descriptive statistics and theχ2 test. Results.
Study findings reveal that 23% of all accidents were recorded in 2013. Thirty-two percent of accidents
occurred in Asia, while 69%of accidentswere recorded in onshore locations. Contractorswere involved
in 86% of accidents, while 28% of accidents occurred during drilling, workover and well services. The
contractor’s work environment was the main human factor in 90% of accident cases. Conclusion. The
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1. Introduction
In the oil and gas industry, human factors have been identi-
fied as the most common causes of catastrophic accidents [1].
For instance, the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 caused 167 fatali-
ties and complete destruction of the offshore platform [2]. The
BP Deepwater Horizon blowout in 2010 – one of the greatest
oil spills ever recorded – resulted in 11 fatalities and spilled
over 4.5million barrels of crude oil in the US Gulf of Mexico
[3]. The BP Texas refinery fire in 2005 caused 15 fatalities and
180 injuries [4]. After investigations, the predominant causal
factors identified in each of these incidents were attributed
to human errors and operational flaws. Perhaps, most acci-
dent investigation tools used in high-risk industries such as
the oil and gas industry were not robust enough to curb acci-
dent occurrence [5]. Therefore, there is an urgent need for
accident investigation to be extended beyond the scope of
direct personnel action or inaction [1]. Consequently, Shap-
pell and Wiegmann [1] developed the human factors anal-
ysis and classification system (HFACS) primarily for accident
investigation in the aviation industry. This framework mod-
eled the Swiss cheese model initially developed by Reason [6],
which explained accident causation at active and latent lev-
els including unsafe acts (active), preconditions for unsafe acts
(latent), unsafe supervision (latent) and organizational influ-
ences (latent). These active and latent categorizations of acci-
dents helped in shifting the focus from individuals to a more
systemic approach of underlying contributing causes. Asides
from the aviation industry forwhich theHFACS frameworkwas
designed, this framework has also been applied across various
industries such as healthcare, railway [7], maritime [8], con-
struction [9] and mining [10]. The current HFACS framework
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is useful in analyzing human factors related to a lack of oper-
ator competency, equipment failure, organizational failures,
safety leadership issues, lack of management commitment
and poor safety culture [1]. However, it fails to account for con-
temporary issues such as sabotage and regulatory deficiencies
that are particular to the oil and gas industry. Consequently,
Theophilus et al. [5] addressed these flaws by developing the
human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and
gas industry (HFACS-OGI) framework to analyze human causal
factors of accidents specifically for the oil and gas industry.
Therefore, this study seeks to analyze human causal factors of
oil andgas accidents using theHFACS-OGI framework. The first
objective of this article was to appraise the trends of accidents
in the oil and gas industry. Secondly, the causal factors of these
accidents, particularly those that occurred from 2013 to 2017,
were analyzed using the HFACS-OGI framework. Lastly, the
study concludes by proffering mitigation measures for acci-
dents in the oil and gas industry based on the accident analysis
findings.
1.1. Accident statistics in the oil and gas industry
A 2016 key performance indicator (KPI) report by the Interna-
tional Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) [11] reveals
a staggering trend of accidents in the oil and gas industry from
2007 to 2016. Although the numbers of fatal accidents and
fatalities have been reduced drastically over the years, 54 fatal-
ities were recorded in 40 accidents in 2015 and 50 fatalities
were documented in 29 accident cases in 2016. These results
therefore reveal that the fatal accident rate (FAR) is on the
increase, at 1.5 in 2015 and 1.7 in 2016. This infers that more
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fatalities occurred in fewer accidents in 2016 than in 2015.
Thus, this raises the question of how robust safety measures
are in oil and gas facilities. A study by Tokarski [12] revealed
that over 30% of major accidents experienced in the oil and
gas industry are triggeredby inadequatemaintenance.DeWolf
[13] opines that piping failures and chemical releases due to
poor maintenance are predominant causal factors of 38% of
accidents in the Netherlands petroleum industry. The Norwe-
gian Shelf has also witnessed over 242 storage tank accidents
largely attributed to poor maintenance and operations [14].
Nonetheless, Darbra et al. [15] argue that external factors like
sabotage, design flaws, equipment malfunction, earthquakes
and climate change events like flooding and high tempera-
tures should not be overlooked. A study by Katsakiori et al.
[16] suggests that the major reason why offshore accidents
keep occurring is due to poor asset integrity, as well as inad-
equate operational discipline and training of staff. Knegtering
and Pasman [17] support this claim by asserting that although
accidents could be stochastic and unpredictable in nature, the
causal factors of most accidents in the oil and gas industry
tend to be similar. Singh et al. [2] suggest that a possible rea-
son for this is the failure to properly learn and benchmark
from previous accidents. Consequently, Skalle et al. [14] are
of the view that integrating human causal factors with techni-
cal factors could help in ascertaining root causes of accidents.
A study by Norazahar et al. [18] on the BP Deepwater Hori-
zon accident in 2010 revealed that inadequate emergency
preparedness, an unsafe environment, the physical ability of
workers and poor communication all contributed as human
andorganizational failures in the accident.While Lees [19] sug-
gests that incompetence is not solely a causal factor of oil and
gas accidents, Lindøe et al. [20] avow that accident statistics
differ across various sectors in the oil and gas industry. This
claim is buttressed by the IOGP [11] in their 2016 KPI report
where the upstream,midstreamanddownstream sectors have
distinct accident causal factors and rates. In their report, var-
ious sectors in the oil and gas industry such as exploration,
drilling, production and construction were all analyzed. The
results revealed that in the last 5 years, the exploration sec-
tor experienced the highest FAR of 2.9 per 100million hours
worked. Further analysis showed that in 2016 Europe recorded
the highest FAR of 5 per 100million hours worked. These
statistics reiterate the importance of thorough analysis human
causal factors in accident causation to develop better miti-
gation measures for accident prevention in the oil and gas
industry.
1.2. Human factors and the HFACS-OGI framework
The Swiss cheese model by Reason [6] proposed that there
are usually latent and underlying factors associatedwith active
causal factors leading up to accidents. Unsafe acts by work-
ers are classified as the active factor, while preconditions for
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and organizational factors fall
under the latent factors [1]. However, Baysari et al. [21] argue
that this model does not exactly provide sufficient details
about active and latent factors, as well as their implementa-
tion. Consequently, Shappell and Wiegmann [1] introduced
the HFACS as an update to Reason’s Swiss cheese model. The
HFACS framework provides sufficient details on each of the
active and latent causal factors of accidents, hence providing
a holistic approach to address human factors [22]. Reason’s
Swiss cheese model was used as a template to design the
HFACS framework; however, various industries have modified
it to suit their scope of operations and activities [7]. Figure
1 illustrates the HFACS-OGI framework designed based on
technical reports from oil and gas organizations such as the
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) [5]. This technical report
was tailored toward addressing the issue of process safety
incidents (fires, explosions, toxic releases) and safety culture
with regards to human factors.
The accident investigation report following the Bhopal dis-
aster in 1984 identified sabotage as the predominant causal
factor that led to the incident [23]. Therefore, the HFACS-
OGI framework included acts of sabotage in its analytical
framework. There are suggestions that contractors experience
more accidents in the oil and gas industry since they are
unfamiliar with the working environment, compared to com-
pany employees [24]. Hence, the HFACS-OGI framework also
considered the contractor environment as a key human fac-
tor in oil and gas accident analysis. The HFACS framework
addressed operators’ conditions from the standpoint of the
entire team, without taking into account the individual capac-
ity of operators [5]. To ensure the safety of oil and gas opera-
tions, individuals and teams are required to possess both inter-
personal and technical skills [25]. Consequently, the HFACS-
OGI framework included individual and team capacity as a
precondition for unsafe acts. It has also been identified that
most offshore accidents are caused when process changes are
not efficiently planned, communicated and coordinated [26].
Hence, the HFACS-OGI framework included management of
change to cater for any changes in the organizational pro-
cess, operating procedures, temporary processes and process
hardware/software. Process safety culture was also included in
the HFACS-OGI framework but not considered in the general
HFACS framework. This is because of the distinct difference
between process safety and occupational safety. While con-
ventional risk management considers occupational hazards
such as slips, trips and falls, there is often oversight when it
comes to process hazards such as fires, explosions and toxic
releases due to loss of containment events [27]. While the
HFACS framework has four levels of accident causation, the
HFACS-OGI framework extended this to include regulatory and
statutory influences that comprise national regulatory frame-
works and international industry standards as subcategories.
2. Materials andmethods
2.1. Research design
This study utilized a quantitative research method to system-
atically examine the human causal factors of accidents in the
oil and gas industry. The quantitativemethod ismore effective
for larger sample sizes and is better than qualitative methods
in yielding unbiased and empirical results [28]. The study pre-
dominantly adopted the use of secondary data from the IOGP
accident database and journal papers. The information gath-
ered from secondary sources and findings obtained from their
data were used as the basis for analyzing oil and gas accidents
using the HFACS-OGI framework. The HFACS-OGI framework
comprised 25 human factors that were used to code accidents
obtained from the IOGP database. Similar to the study by Shi-
rali et al. [29], a binary systemwas used to codify the causal fac-
tors that were present or absent in each of the accident cases,
such that 0 = absent and 1 = present. This helped in identi-
fying the most frequently occurring human causal factors of
accidents in the oil and gas industry.
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Figure 1. HFACS-OGI framework for accident causation [5].
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
2.2. Data collection
The studyused the IOGPdatabaseas a sourceofdata collection
for accidents in the oil and gas industry. The IOGP is the voice
of the global upstream industry comprisingmember countries
who produce 40% of the world’s oil and gas supply in regions
such as Australia, Asia, the Caspian, the Middle East, Europe,
Africa and the Americas. They partner with industry regula-
tors to improve safety, environmental and social performance
through the sharing of knowledge and statistics by member
countries to improve health, safety, environment, security and
social responsibility. The IOGP retains an accurate worldwide
accident and incident database in the oil and gas industry for
over 90 organizations and agencies; hence, their data offer a
true reflection of health and safety statistics in the oil and gas
industry [30].
The study collected data concerning fatal accidents in the
oil and gas industry from 2013 to 2017. These fatal accidents
involved any incidents with one or more fatality. The search
criteria in the IOGP database were streamlined to accident
cases in all oil and gas regions, countries, functions, activi-
ties, accident causes, locations and employers. After searching
using these criteria, a total of 184 accident cases were iden-
tified from 2013 to 2017. Each of these accidents had their
incident descriptions, number of fatalities and the events lead-
ing up to the accidents. For reference purposes, the search
criteria applied to obtain the results are shown in Appendix
1 (see Supplemental data). These data were then collected,
exported and collated using Microsoft Excel version 2017. The
collected data were grouped into different categories accord-
ing to year, region, country, fatalities, employer type, loca-
tion, accident category, operation, incident description and
causes. A detailed presentation of the collected and collated
data can be found in Appendices 1 and 2 (see Supplemental
data).
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Also, as shown in Appendices 1–3 (see Supplemental data),
an HFACS incident description sheet from the HFACSwebsite?
was downloaded and used as a guide to understand what
each human factor in the HFACS-OGI framework entailed. For
example, skill-based errors in the HFACS-OGI framework was
described as:
Highly practiced behavior that occurs with little or no conscious
thought. These ‘doing’ errors frequently appear as breakdown
in visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/deactivation of
switches, forgotten intentions, and omitted items in checklists
often appear. Even the manner or technique with which one per-
forms a task is included HFACS [31].
Therefore, any accident that had any of these factors high-
lighted in their incident descriptions on the IOGP database
was identified to have been caused by skill-based errors. The
same process was repeated for all human factors in each acci-
dent, which helped in coding the root causes of the accidents.
The entire process of data collection for the study lasted for a
period of 1month.
2.3. Data analysis
Trend analysis was used to analyze the coded accident data
in order to understand the accident trend in recent years,
location, geographical region, worker type, accident category
and nature of operation. Descriptive statistics were employed
to obtain the percentage frequency of human factor occur-
rence in all 184 accident cases. The χ2 test of association was
conducted in this study using SPSS version 25.0 to ascertain




Figure 2 illustrates the 5-year accident trend in the oil and gas
industry from 2013 to 2017. The highest number of 43 acci-
dents occurred in 2013, while the least number of 29 accidents
occurred in 2016. Forty-two accidents were recorded in 2014,
40 in 2015 and 30 in 2017. Similarly, the most fatalities of 80
deaths occurred in 2013 while the least fatalities of 33 deaths
were recorded in 2017. Also, the FAR showed that the aver-
age number of fatalities per accident were highest in 2013 at
1.86, followed by 2016 with 1.72, then 2015 with 1.35, 2017
with 1.10 and 2014with 1.07. The highest number of accidents
and fatalities were recorded in 2013, and this year also had the
highest averagenumberof fatalities recorded in eachaccident.
Hence, the FAR provides a better yardstick for ascertaining the
trends of fatal accidents [11]. A linear trend line was also used
to project future trends of oil and gas accidents, and showed a
steady decrease in the number of oil and gas accidents. How-
ever, judging by the line regression R2 value of 0.1463 (which
becomes more accurate as it tends toward 1), this trend line
may not be exactly accurate in its predictions [32]. Amajor rea-
son for this could be the unpredictable and stochastic nature
of accident occurrence, thereby implying that there may not
necessarily be a decrease in oil and gas accidents in the future
as predicted by the trendline, especially if adequatemitigation
measures are not put in place [33].
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the IOGP accident data categorized accord-
ing to accident trends, location, worker type, accident cat-
egory, nature of operations and human factor analysis. The
accidents in this study were also analyzed accordingly basing
on operating regions across the globe. Asia recorded 59 acci-
dents, North America 48 accidents, Africa 31 accidents, Europe
25 accidents, South andCentral America 15 accidents andAus-
tralasia 6 accidents. While the onshore regions recorded 69%
of accidents from 2013 to 2017, offshore locations witnessed
31% of accidents. The numbers of workers involved in oil and
gas accidents during this period were also analyzed accord-
ing to their roles; either company or contract staff. A total
86% of accident cases were recorded among contractor work-
ers, while 14% of accidents involved company workers. Under
the accident categories, the most predominant accident was
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) accident data collected from 2013 to 2017.
Oil and gas region
Africa Asia Australasia Europe North, South and Central America
Variable 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Accident trends
Number of accidents 9 5 7 4 6 11 9 10 17 12 0 2 1 2 1 8 7 7 2 1 15 19 15 4 10
Fatalities 27 5 10 10 6 12 10 13 18 12 0 2 1 3 1 12 7 8 14 2 29 21 22 5 12
Average fatalities per
accident
3 1 1.4 2.5 1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1 0 1 1 1.5 1 1.5 1 1.1 7 2 1.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.2
Location
Onshore 5 3 6 3 2 8 4 8 14 11 0 2 0 2 1 6 6 6 1 1 7 14 6 3 8
Offshore 4 2 1 1 4 3 5 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 8 5 9 1 2
Worker type
Company 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 3 1 2 1 1
Contractor 8 5 6 4 5 11 9 9 16 7 0 2 1 2 1 6 5 5 1 1 12 18 13 3 9
Accident category
Assault or violent act 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aviation accident 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Caught in, under or
between
1 2 1 0 2 3 0 2 4 5 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 5 5 0 2
Confined space 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Cut, puncture or scrape 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electric shock 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fall from height 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 2 0 1 0
Other 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0















Oil and gas region
Africa Asia Australasia Europe
North, South and
Central America
Variable 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Pressure release 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0
Struck by 3 3 3 1 0 3 3 4 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 1 7 3 1 5





0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0
Diving, subsea, ROV 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Drilling, workover, well
services
3 1 0 0 7 4 1 4 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 0 0 3 9 2 2 4
Lifting, crane, rigging,
deck operations
1 1 1 1 4 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 2 1 2
Maintenance,
inspection, testing




0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Production operations 1 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 1
Seismic survey
operations
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Transport – air 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Transport – land 0 2 1 0 3 4 3 4 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2
Transport – water 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Unspecified 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0
Unsafe acts (%)
Skill-based error 5 4 2 2 4 4 6 3 10 12 0 1 1 2 1 4 2 1 1 0 9 7 6 3 8
Decision error 4 1 0 0 0 7 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 1 1 0 0 6 2 2 0 1
Perceptual error 3 2 1 0 1 2 4 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 7 4 5 0 1
Routine violation 5 1 2 2 4 7 1 4 10 12 0 1 0 1 1 4 2 4 1 0 5 8 5 4 8
Exceptional violation 4 3 0 0 0 7 4 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 3 0 0 7 8 2 0 0
Acts of sabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0
Preconditions for unsafe
acts (%)







































Contractor environment 6 4 7 4 6 8 7 10 17 12 0 1 1 2 1 7 7 6 1 1 14 16 14 4 10
Technological
environment
7 3 5 4 6 8 4 6 16 12 0 1 1 2 1 4 6 7 1 1 10 13 10 4 10
Adverse mental state 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 3 0 0
Adverse physiological
state
0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0
Physical/mental
limitations
2 2 1 2 4 2 6 1 9 12 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 0 1 0 5 6 9 3 8
Crew resource
management
5 1 3 2 4 5 6 6 11 12 0 1 0 2 1 6 0 5 1 0 10 6 6 4 8
Personal readiness 4 1 2 2 4 3 5 6 11 12 0 2 0 2 1 3 1 4 1 0 8 5 9 3 8
Unsafe supervision (%)
Supervisory violations 6 2 0 2 4 4 1 0 9 12 0 0 0 1 1 6 1 1 1 0 6 5 0 4 8
Planned inappropriate
operations
6 4 3 0 0 8 5 5 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 2 6 0 0 6 10 6 1 0
Failed to correct known
problem
4 1 1 2 4 5 2 2 9 12 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 0 1 0 6 7 4 4 8
Inadequate supervision 5 1 3 0 0 8 6 7 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 7 2 6 0 0 11 11 9 2 1
Management of change 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Organizational influences
(%)
Resource management 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 5 7 0 0
Organizational climate 6 2 3 2 4 7 6 6 10 12 0 2 0 2 1 6 3 6 1 0 9 14 11 4 8
Process safety culture 3 1 4 0 0 3 3 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 3 4 0 0 10 7 5 0 0





6 1 1 0 0 5 2 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 1 1 1 0 6 6 3 1 1
National regulatory
framework
6 1 1 0 0 4 2 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 6 6 3 1 1
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of accidents. Twenty-one percent of accidents involved work-
ers getting caught in, under or between equipment and 14%
of accidents were associated with explosions or burns. The
operation with the highest number of accidents was drilling,
workover and well services, which was recorded in 28% of all
accidents. A total of 16% of accidents occurred during land
transportation, 12% of accidents were recorded during main-
tenance, inspection and testing operations, while construc-




As illustrated in Figure 3, unsafe acts of oil and gas accidents
were analyzed according to their geographical regions. Asia
recorded the highest number of 35 accidents caused by skill-
based error, followed by 33 in America, 17 in Africa, 8 in Europe
and 5 in Australasia. Similarly, decision errors were highest in
Asia with 13 accidents, next to 11 in America, 8 in Europe, 5 in
Africa and 1 in Australasia. However, America had the highest
number of 17 accidents with perceptual error, followed by 12
in Asia, 7 each in Africa and Europe, and 3 in Australasia. Rou-
tine violation led to 34 accidents in Asia, 30 in America, 14 in
Africa, 11 in Europe and 3 in Australasia. However, exceptional
violation led to 17 accidents in America, 13 in Asia, 9 in Europe,
7 in Africa and 2 in Australasia. No accidents were caused by
acts of sabotage in Africa, Asia or Australasia; however, Europe
recorded one accident and America recorded two accidents.
3.3.2. Preconditions for unsafe acts
Figure 4 illustrates oil and gas accidents in various geographi-
cal regions caused by preconditions for unsafe acts. The phys-
ical environment was responsible for 31 accidents in Asia,
29 in America, 11 in Africa, 6 in Europe and 4 in Australasia.
Fifty-eight accidents in America were caused by the contrac-
tor environment, 54 in Asia, 27 in Africa, 22 in Europe and 5
in Australasia. Similarly, the technological environment led to
47 accidents in America, 46 in Asia, 25 in Africa, 19 in Europe
and 5 in Australasia. In America, adverse mental state led to
8 accidents, 3 in Asia, 2 in Africa and 1 in Europe, and Aus-
tralasia recorded no incidents. Six accidents in America were
caused by adverse physiological state, 3 in Africa, 2 in Europe,
1 in Asia and none in Australasia. Physical/mental limitations
were highlighted in 31 accidents in America, 30 in Asia, 11 in
Africa, 7 in Europe and 4 in Australasia. However, in Asia, there
were 40 accidents caused by crew resource management, 34
in America, 15 in Africa, 12 in Europe and 4 in Australasia. Per-
sonal readiness caused 37 accidents in Asia, 33 in America, 13
in Africa, 9 in Europe and 5 in Australasia.
3.3.3. Unsafe supervision
Figure 5 illustrates oil and gas accidents in various geograph-
ical regions caused by unsafe supervision. Supervisory viola-
tions led to 26 accidents in Asia, 23 in America, 14 in Africa, 9
in Europe and 2 in Australasia. However, planned inappropri-
ate operations triggered 23 accidents in America, 22 in Asia,
13 in Africa, 11 in Europe and 2 in Australasia. Failure to cor-
rect a known problem was recorded as a causal factor in 30
accidents in Asia, 29 in America, 12 in Africa, 8 in Europe and
2 in Australasia. Inadequate supervisionwas responsible for 34
accidents in America, 28 in Asia, 15 in Europe, 9 in Africa and 1
in Australasia. Lastly, management of change caused four acci-
dents in Asia and three in each of America, Europe and Africa,
and Australasia recorded no accidents.
3.3.4. Organizational influences
Figure 6 illustrates oil and gas accidents in various geograph-
ical regions caused by organizational influences. Resource
management was the cause of 13 accidents in America, 8 in
Asia, 5 in Europe, 3 in Africa and none in Australasia. Similarly,
Figure 3. Oil and gas accidents caused by unsafe acts using the HFACS-OGI framework.
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
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Figure 4. Oil and gas accidents caused by preconditions for unsafe acts using the HFACS-OGI framework.
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
Figure 5. Oil and gas accidents caused by unsafe supervision using the HFACS-OGI framework.
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
the organizational climate triggered 46 accidents in America,
41 in Asia, 17 in Africa, 16 in Europe and 5 in Australasia. How-
ever, process safety culture led to 22 accidents in America, 12
in Europe, 11 in Asia, 8 in Africa and 2 in Australasia. Organiza-
tional process caused 55 accidents in Asia, 52 in America, 29 in
Africa, 18 in Europe and 5 in Australasia.
3.3.5. Regulatory and statutory influences
Figure 7 illustrates oil and gas accidents in various geograph-
ical regions caused by regulatory and statutory influences.
International industry standards led to17accidents inAmerica,
11 in Asia, 9 in Europe, 8 in Africa and 2 in Australasia. Simi-
larly, the national regulatory framework caused 17 accidents in
America, 10 in Asia, 8 in Africa, 7 in Europe and 2 in Australasia.
3.4. X2 test of association
Pearson’s χ2 statistical test was conducted using SPSS version
25.0. An asymptotic significance value less than 0.05 in the χ2
test indicates that there is a statistically significant relation-
ship between two variables. Table 2 presents strong degrees
of association across various latent and active human causal
factors in the HFACS-OGI framework, with 0.000–0.033 being
































Africa Asia Australasia Europe America
Figure 6. Oil and gas accidents caused by organizational influences using the HFACS-OGI framework.
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
Figure 7. Oil and gas accidents caused by regulatory and statutory influences using the HFACS-OGI framework.
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
the range of values between active and latent human factors.
These values indicate strong association between the active
and latent human factors in the HFACS-OGI framework. For
example, one of the causes of skill-based error from Table
2 is crew resource management, which also had inadequate
supervision as one of its causes. Inadequate supervision was
further linked to the organizational climate and then flaws in
the national regulatory framework. This applies to every other
active causal factor that must have been triggered by a long
chain of latent factors.
4. Discussion
The human factor analysis results reveal that the contractor’s
environment was the most predominant human causal factor
of 90% of oil and gas accidents from 2013 to 2017. The organi-
zational process was also identified in 86% of these accidents,
while 77% were attributed to technological environment fac-
tors. The organizational climate led to 68% of accidents during
this period, while crew resource management was respon-
sible for 57% of accidents. Skilled-based error and personal
readiness played a role in 53% of the accidents, while routine
violation caused 50%. Therefore, the evidence suggests that
theworking conditions of contractors put themat risk of expo-
sure to accidents as they are the main operating staff in the
oil and gas industry [24]. Also, contractors are usually unfamil-
iar with the work environment and often have disparities in
safety standards and processes from their contracting orga-
nizations [34]. This explains why there are huge flaws in the
organizational process and technology used in carrying out
these operations. Ideally, human factor analysis examines the
relationship between man (contractor), machine (technology)
and procedure (process) [1]. Hence, these three main facets of
human factors were identified as the main causes of accidents
in the study.
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Table 2. χ2 results showing significant associations between active and latent human factors.








Skill-based error × adverse mental
state
0.011 Technological environment ×
supervisory violations
0.001
Skill-based error × physical/mental
limitations
0.000 Technological environment × failure
to correct problem
0.003
Skill-based error × crew resource
management
0.000 Physical/mental limitations ×
supervisory violations
0.000
Skill-based error× personal readiness 0.000 Physical/mental limitations× planned
inappropriate operations
0.006
Decision error × crew resource
management
0.000 Physical/mental limitations× Failed to
correct problem
0.000
Perceptual error × adverse mental
state
0.000 Crew resource management ×
supervisory violations
0.000
Perceptual error × adverse
physiological state
0.006 Crew resource management × failed
to correct problem
0.000
Perceptual error × physical/mental
limitations





0.000 Personal readiness × supervisory
violations
0.000
Routine violation × physical
environment
0.000 Personal readiness × failed to correct
problem
0.001
Routine violation × adverse mental
state
0.005 Supervisory violations ×
organizational process
0.000
Planned inappropriate operations ×
process safety culture
0.000 Planned inappropriate operations ×
organizational climate
0.004
Routine violation × physical/mental
limitations
0.000 Failure to correct problem ×
organizational climate
0.000
Routine violation × crew resource
management
0.000 Inadequate supervision ×
organizational climate
0.005
Routine violation× personal readiness 0.000 Inadequate supervision × process
safety culture
0.000
Act of sabotage × technological
environment





0.000 Organizational climate× international
industry standards
0.010
Physical environment × supervisory
violations
0.000 Process safety culture × international
industry standards
0.000
Physical environment × failed to
correct problem
0.000 Process safety culture × national
regulatory framework
0.000
– – Organizational climate × national
regulatory framework
0.008
Note: HFACS-OGI = human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry.
From the χ2 analysis, national regulatory frameworks and
international regulatory standardswere found tobe significant
root causal factors that triggered flaws in the process safety
culture, organizational climate and resource management.
Singhet al. [2] assert that theBPDeepwaterHorizonblowout in
2010 was caused largely by regulatory deficiencies of the Min-
erals Management Service (MMS), which was the institution in
the USA responsible for licensing and regulation of oil and gas
operations.
The poor process safety culture and organizational climate
in turn led to inadequate supervision and failing to correct
known problems due to a lack of management commitment.
Fuller and Vassie [35] identify poor safety culture and climate
as key drivers of accident causation in the oil and gas indus-
try. Crew resource management flaws were significantly influ-
enced by inadequate supervision, failure to correct problems
and supervisory violations. Besides, Crichton [25] opines that
attitude to teamwork and leadership are predominant causal
factors among drilling teams in the upstream oil and gas sec-
tor. Further evidence from results shows that failure to correct
problems, planned inappropriate operations and supervisory
violations led to physical and mental limitations in workers.
Skalle et al. [14] stress that the complex nature of oil and gas
operations affects the ability of workers to effectively con-
duct safe operations. There were also issues with the physical
and technological environments, which were both caused by
failure to correct problems and supervisory violations. Ismail
et al. [3] posit that the nature of the oil and gas work envi-
ronment has an extremely high risk profile, thus increasing the
likelihood and severity of accidents.
The χ2 test results also revealed that weaknesses in the
technological environment also increased alongside acts of
sabotage. Routine violation of procedures was usually caused
by a fair number of underlying factors such as lack of personal
readiness, poor crew resource management, physical/mental
limitations of workers, adverse mental state of employees
and unsafe physical environment. Saleh et al. [4] argue that
lack of operational discipline could lead to routine violations,
especially when there is poor safety climate throughout the
organization. Perceptual errors were also jointly caused by
an adverse physiological state, an adverse mental state and
physical/mental limitations. The risk perception of workers is
suggested to be improved by ensuring that competent work-
ers with adequate knowledge, ability, training and experience
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are selected for specialized tasks [22]. There is evidence that
decision errors were triggered by poor crew resourcemanage-
ment while skill-based errors were caused by personal readi-
ness, crew resource management, physical/mental limitations
and adverse mental state of workers. Routine drills, exercises
and refresher trainings are pivotal in ensuring that workers
make the right decisions when confronted with emergency
situations [18].
5. Conclusion
The oil and gas industry has witnessed numerous catastrophic
accidents that are undoubtedly attributed to human factors.
The IOGP accident database for the oil and gas industry was
instrumental to the 184 accident cases used for the study
analysis. This study utilized the HFACS-OGI framework as an
accident investigation and analysis tool for determining the
root causes of accidents. The study findings reveal that 2013
recorded the highest number of 43 accidents. Asia recorded
the highest number of 59 accidents, with 127 accidents
occurring in onshore locations. Contractors were involved in
159 accidents, while 51 accidents occurred during drilling,
workover and well services. The contractor’s work environ-
ment was the main cause of human factors, accounting for
90% of total accidents analyzed in the study. The human
errors identified in this study responsible for accidents caused
by contractors may be reduced through the formulation and
implementation of policies where contractors are provided
with site induction and tours by the contract owner before
mobilization to site and job commencement. This will provide
site familiarization and relevant information for the contractor
to consider when preparing risk assessments and safety plans.
The risk assessments and safety plans should be reviewed by
the contract owner, which will provide the opportunity for
standards and processes of both parties to be aligned and dis-
cussedbybothparties duringa kick-offmeeting. Theχ2 results
confirm that the root causal factors of these accidents arise
from failures in national and international regulations influ-
enced by operating personnel. Another deduction from the
study is that theHFACS-OGI frameworkproved tobeavital tool
for robust accident analysis of human factors in the oil and gas
industry.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Coventry University and the International Asso-
ciation of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) for their contribution and support
to the development of this study.
Disclosure statement




Stephen C. Theophilus http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6677-2589
Victor N. Esenowo http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7947-0165
References
[1] Shappell SA,WiegmannDA. A human error approach to aviation acci-
dent analysis: the human factors analysis and classification system.
Aldershot: Ashgate; 2012.
[2] Singh B, Jukes P, Poblete B, et al. 20 Years on lessons learned from
Piper Alpha. The evolution of concurrent and inherently safe design.
J Loss PrevProcess Ind. 2010;23(6):936–953. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2010.07.
011
[3] Ismail Z, Kong KK, Othman SZ, et al. Evaluating accidents in the off-
shore drilling of petroleum: regional picture and reducing impact.
Measurement. 2014;51:18–33. doi:10.1016/j.measurement.2014.01.
027
[4] Saleh JH, Haga RA, Favarò FM, et al. Texas City refinery acci-
dent: case study in breakdown of defense-in-depth and violation
of the safety–diagnosability principle in design. Eng Failure Anal.
2014;36:121–133. doi:10.1016/j.engfailanal.2013.09.014
[5] Theophilus SC, Esenowo VN, Arewa AO, et al. Human factors analy-
sis and classification system for the oil and gas industry (HFACS-OGI).
Reliabil Eng System Saf. 2017;167:168–176. doi:10.1016/j.ress.2017.
05.036
[6] Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ. 2000;320
(7237):768–770. doi:10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768
[7] Reinach S, Viale A. Application of a human error framework to
conduct train accident/incident investigations. Accident Anal Prev.
2006;38(2):396–406. doi:10.1016/j.aap.2005.10.013
[8] Chen S-T, Wall A, Davies P, et al. A human and organisational factors
(HOFs) analysismethod formarine casualties usingHFACS– maritime
accidents (HFACS-MA). Saf Sci. 2013;60:105–114. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.
2013.06.009
[9] Hale A, Walker D, Walters N, et al. Developing the understand-
ing of underlying causes of construction fatal accidents. Saf Sci.
2012;50(10):2020–2027. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2012.01.018
[10] Patterson JM, Shappell SA. Operator error and system deficien-
cies: analysis of 508 mining incidents and accidents from Queens-
land, Australia using HFACS. Accid Anal Prev. 2010;42(4):1379–1385.
doi:10.1016/j.aap.2010.02.018
[11] IOGP. Safety performance indicators – 2016 data [Internet]. London:
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers; 2017 [cited 2017
Jul 6]. Available from: https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/
safety-performance-indicators-2016-data/
[12] Tokarski E. The safety professional’s role: in support of industrial facil-
ities operations and maintenance (O&M). Bloomington (IN): Xlibris
Corporation; 2013.
[13] DeWolf GB. Process safety management in the pipeline industry: par-
allels and differences between the pipeline integrity management
(IMP) rule of the Office of Pipeline Safety and the PSM/RMP approach
for process facilities. J Hazardous Mat. 2003;104(1–3):169–192.
doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2003.08.008
[14] Skalle P, AamodtA, LaumannK. Integratinghuman relatederrorswith
technical errors to determine causes behind offshore accidents. Saf
Sci. 2014;63:179–190. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2013.11.009
[15] Darbra RM, Palacios A, Casal J. Domino effect in chemical acci-
dents: main features and accident sequences. J Hazardous Mat.
2010;183(1–3):565–573. doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2010.07.061
[16] Katsakiori P, Sakellaropoulos G, Manatakis E. Towards an evalu-
ation of accident investigation methods in terms of their align-
ment with accident causationmodels. Saf Sci. 2009;47(7):1007–1015.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2008.11.002
[17] Knegtering B, Pasman H. The safety barometer. J Loss Prev Process
Ind. 2013;26(4):821–829. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2013.02.012
[18] Norazahar N, Khan F, Veitch B, et al. Human andorganizational factors
assessment of the evacuation operation of BP Deepwater Horizon
accident. Saf Sci. 2014;70:41–49. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2014.05.002
[19] Lees F. Lees’ loss prevention in the process industries: hazard iden-
tification, assessment and control. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann;
2012.
[20] Lindøe PH, Engen OA, Olsen OE. Responses to accidents in different
industrial sectors. Saf Sci. 2011;49(1):90–97. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2009.
12.007
[21] Baysari MT, McIntosh AS, Wilson JR. Understanding the human fac-
tors contribution to railway accidents and incidents inAustralia. Accid
Anal Prev. 2008;40(5):1750–1757. doi:10.1016/j.aap.2008.06.013
[22] Aas AL. The human factors assessment and classification system
(HFACS) for the oil & gas industry. In International Petroleum Tech-
nology Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 3–5; 2008.
Available from: https://doi.org/10.2523/IPTC-12694-MS
[23] Goh YM, Tan S, Lai KC. Learning from the Bhopal disaster to improve
process safety management in Singapore. Process Saf Environ Prot.
2015;97:102–108. doi:10.1016/j.psep.2015.02.004
[24] Berends K. Engineering and construction projects for oil and gas
processing facilities: contracting, uncertainty and the economics of
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND ERGONOMICS (JOSE) 13
information. EnergyPolicy. 2007;35(8):4260–4270. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.
2007.02.027
[25] Crichton M. Attitudes to teamwork, leadership, and stress in oil
industry drilling teams. Saf Sci. 2005;43(9):679–696. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.
2005.08.020
[26] Zwetsloot GIJM, Gort J, Steijger N, et al. Management of change:
lessons learned from staff reductions in the chemical process indus-
try. Saf Sci. 2007;45(7):769–789. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2006.08.028
[27] Attwood D, Khan F, Veitch B. Offshore oil and gas occupa-
tional accidents – what is important? J Loss Prev Process Ind.
2006;19(5):386–3398. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2005.10.006
[28] Al-Ghamdi AS. Using logistic regression to estimate the influ-
ence of accident factors on accident severity. Accid Anal Prev.
2002;34(6):729–741. doi:10.1016/S0001-4575(01)00073-2
[29] Shirali G, Shekari M, Angali KA. Quantitative assessment of resilience
safety culture using principal components analysis and numerical
taxonomy: a case study in a petrochemical plant. J Loss Prev Process
Ind. 2016;40:277–284. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.01.007
[30] IOGP. IOGP fatal incidents [Internet]; London: International Associa-
tionofOil andGas Producers 2019 [cited 2019 Sep26]. Available from:
https://safetyzone.iogp.org/FatalIncidents/fatalincidents.asp
[31] HFACS. HFACS, Inc | Definitions [Internet]. 2014 [cited 2019 Sep 26].
Available from: https://www.hfacs.com/definitions.html
[32] Kirchsteiger C. Trends in accidents, disasters and risk sources in
Europe. J Loss Prev Process Ind. 1999;12(1):7–17. doi:10.1016/S0950-
4230(98)00033-3
[33] Reiman T, Rollenhagen C, Pietikäinen E, et al. Principles of adap-
tive management in complex safety-critical organizations. Saf Sci.
2015;71:80–92. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2014.07.021
[34] Griffiths S. A review and assessment of energy policy in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa region. Energy Policy. 2017;102:249–269.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.023
[35] Fuller CW, Vassie LH. Benchmarking the safety climates of employ-
ees and contractors working within a partnership arrangement: a
case study in the offshore oil industry. Bench Int J. 2001;8(5):413–430.
doi:10.1108/EUM0000000006386
